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Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: 
Does Risky Debt Serve any Purpose?
by C. N. V. Krishnan, P. H. Ritchken, J. B. Thomson
We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would serve to enhance market
monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we
extract the credit-spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in
credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity
variables. We find that they do not. Our result is robust to firm type, examination rating, size, leverage
and profitability, as well as to different model specifications. To evaluate whether subordinated debt
controls risk taking, we examine whether issuing subordinated debt changes the risk-taking behavior of a
bank. We find that it does not. We conclude that a mandatory subordinated debt requirement for banks is
unlikely to provide the purported benefits of enhancing risk monitoring or controlling risk-taking.
JEL Classification: G12, G21, G28
Key Words: credit spreads, market discipline, subordinated debtSince the mid 1980s economists have debated the merits of regulations that would require
banks to issue a minimum level of subordinated notes and debentures (SND). Proponents of this
regulation suggest that SND will enhance market discipline and curb excessive risk taking in two
ways: through risk monitoring and through preventative inﬂuence. The beneﬁts of monitoring
are realized if investors accurately understand changes in a ﬁrm’s risk condition and incorporate
their assessment promptly into the prices of risky debt issued by the ﬁrm. If they do, then
changes in credit spreads will provide useful information to regulators and assist in supervision.
This is referred to as indirect market discipline. The direct eﬀect results from the increased costs
of funding that result from investors being able to accurately reprice debt, should the bank adopt
riskier strategies. Due to market risk monitoring, banks with SND may be less likely to adopt
risky strategies in the ﬁrst place. This is the preventative inﬂuence role of SND.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether SND issued by banks and bank holding
companies (BHCs) (together referred to as banking ﬁrms) enhance risk monitoring and/or have
preventative inﬂuence. To evaluate risk monitoring, we examine whether changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risks get reﬂected in changes in credit spreads of SND issued by banking ﬁrms, after controlling
for economy wide factors and liquidity factors. To evaluate preventative inﬂuence, we examine
changes in risk characteristics of banks and BHCs after they ﬁrst issued SND.
We focus on banking ﬁrms because policymakers are actively considering the use of subordi-
nated debt as a regulatory tool. A consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (1999) proposes new risk-based capital standards (Basel II) that seeks to improve
the incentive eﬀects of capital regulation through increased granularity in risk measurement,
improved supervision, and increased market discipline. Mandatory subordinated debt require-
ment appears to be the cornerstone of Basel II’s market discipline provisions. In addition, the
U.S Shadow Regulatory Committee has come out strongly in favor of mandatory SND as a
mechanism for realizing enhanced market discipline of banks. Finally, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 mandated a joint Federal Reserve and U. S. Treasury study of bank subordinated
debt requirements. This legislation also requires all large banking ﬁrms to have at least one
issue of subordinated debt outstanding at all times.
A lengthy literature exists that addresses the question of whether market prices of liabilities
respond to individual bank risk taking. To date the results of empirical studies have been mixed.
Studies done prior to 1992 fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁrm risk and yields on
subordinated debt.1 More recent studies, however, do indicate that risk is being appropriately
priced. For example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) ﬁnd that for banks over the 1983-1991
1Examples include Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988), Gorton and Santomero (1990), who ﬁnd no eﬀects,
Cramer and Rogowski (1985) and Goldberg, Jooyd-Davies (1985) who obtain mixed conclusions, and Baer and
Brewer (1986), and Hannan and Hanweck (1988). For excellent reviews of this literature see Flannery (1998) and
Bliss (2000).
1period, yields on SND were aﬀected by accounting measures of risk. Jagtiani, Kaufman and
Lemieux (2000) conﬁrm this result for the post-1991 period; a period that follows the passage of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) that supposedly made
the breadth of the safety net for banks more restrictive.2 A related literature concerns itself
with the extent to which ﬁnancial market prices contain timely and accurate information on
the ﬁnancial condition of banks that is of use to bank supervisors. Empirical studies by Berger,
Davies and Flannery (2000), DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and Sorescu (2001) and Evanoﬀ and
Wall (2001) indicate that neither the market nor the supervisors possess all information on
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk.
In almost all of the SND studies, the credit spread of SND is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in basis
points between the yield to maturity (YTM) of the issue and the YTM of an equivalent Treasury
security. For example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) calculate the default risk premium as the
SND yield minus the YTM of a treasury bond with approximately the same maturity date. Yu
(2002) uses credit spreads as the dependent variable that is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the
yield to maturity on a corporate bond and the interpolated constant maturity Treasury yields.3
Once obtained, these spread measures are often used as dependent variables, in a regression
equation against risk variables.4 No studies in this literature, that we are aware of, attempt to
extract the term structure of credit-spreads for each bank. The importance of this is now well
recognized. There is now much empirical evidence to suggest that credit spreads of diﬀerent
maturities for the same ﬁrm may move in diﬀerent directions. In particular, the credit-spread
curve can, over time, move upward, downward, or reﬂect humped shaped shocks. We contribute
to the literature by carefully extracting entire credit-spread curve for each ﬁrm for each quarter,
a n dt h e nr e l a t i n gchanges in credit spreads at diﬀerent points on the credit-spread curve to
changes in risk variables.
We ﬁrst examine whether ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk variables inﬂuence credit spreads levels,a n d
conﬁrm that they do, even after controlling for market-wide and liquidity variables. However,
relating levels of credit spreads to levels of ﬁrm risk variables is a necessary but not suﬃcient
condition for credit spreads to serve as a information signal on changing bank risk. We need
changes in bank risk to be reﬂected in credit spread changes. Hence, we examine whether
changes in credit spreads reﬂect changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks after controlling for market-wide
and liquidity factors, and ﬁnd that they do not. We subdivide our sample of banking ﬁrms
2Other recent studies include De Young et al (2001), Morgan and Stiroh (2001) and Sironi (2002).
3The economic interpretation of the resulting spread is ambiguous since coupon diﬀerentials between the risky
and riskless bonds are not explicitly accounted for, and the durations of the two bonds could be quite diﬀerent.
Moreover, even if the durations were identical, comparing credit spreads for two issues from the same ﬁrm, could
lead to very diﬀerent results due to maturity eﬀects.
4Alternatively, structural option pricing models can be used in which the relationship of large uninsured
liabilities cannot be described by a linear function of risk variables.
2by banks and BHCs, by examination rating, by size, by leverage, and by proﬁtability, and
reestimate our model. We ﬁnd that our result is robust. Next we reestimate our model with
three new regression speciﬁcations. We replace all variables that are time dependent with time
ﬁxed eﬀects dummies to capture all time varying factors. We include lagged ﬁrm risk levels
in our regression models to capture the possibility that the eﬀect of ﬁrm risk changes may
be a function of the starting risk level. We include stock returns and changes in examination
(CAMELS and BOPEC) ratings as control factors in our regression models. We do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between changes in bank risk variables and changes in credit
spreads.
Our result could be due to the fact that banking ﬁrms are highly regulated. Therefore, we
use a sample of non-banking ﬁrms as a control group. We again ﬁnd that changes in credit
spreads do not reﬂect changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk characteristics, after controlling for changes
in market and liquidity variables. Thus, our result appears to be more general than for just
banking ﬁrms.
Because we extracted the term structure of credit spreads for each ﬁrm, we analyze the
determinants of credit-spread slope and changes in credit-spread slope. Consistent with our
results on credit spread levels and changes in credit spread levels, we ﬁnd that while credit-spread
slope is determined by ﬁrm risk variables, we are unable to relate changes in credit-spread slope
to changes in ﬁrm risk variables.
Since credit spread changes are not informative of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk changes, our results cast
doubt on the usefulness of credit spread changes as an information signal for bank supervisors,
and in particular, as a triggering mechanism for special audits. However, this result does not
imply that the issuance of SND serves no purpose. After all, given that credit spread levels and
slope reﬂect ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, the very issuance of SND may alter the incentives of managers
and eﬀect the risk taking behavior of a bank. Speciﬁcally, banks may take actions that result in
lower risk just because risky debt exists on the balance sheet. This is the disciplinary eﬀect, or
preventative inﬂuence role of risky debt that helps regulators by reducing risk-taking in the ﬁrst
place. To address this possible role of SND, we examine how bank risk changes after a banking
ﬁrm ﬁrst issues SND. We use two measures of ﬁrm risk changes: raw risk changes and matched-
adjusted risk changes over and above a portfolio of size, leverage and proﬁtability matched non
SND-issuing banking ﬁrms for each SND-issuing banking ﬁrm. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change in
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk characteristics. Thus, we fail to ﬁnd evidence consistent with preventative
inﬂuence eﬀect for SND.
We therefore conclude that making issuance of SND mandatory for banking ﬁrms is unlikely
to provide the purported beneﬁts of enhanced risk monitoring or preventative inﬂuence, as
envisioned by the Basel committee. Nevertheless, our results do not mean that mandatory SND
serves no purpose whatsoever. SND can still reduce the exposure of the deposit insurance fund
3and uninsured depositors to losses associated with bank failures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section describes the data
extraction process and our ﬁnal data. Section 2 sets out the model we use to construct the
credit spread curves for each ﬁrm and discusses the ﬁt. Section 3 describes our sets of ﬁrm
speciﬁc risk variables, market variables and liquidity variables. Section 4 examines whether
risky debt facilitates market monitoring of bank risk. Section 5 examines whether risky debt
has preventative inﬂuence beneﬁts for banking ﬁrms. Section 6 concludes.
1D a t a
Our ﬁrst task is to construct credit spread curves at the end of each quarter for as many diﬀerent
banks as possible, and then to repeat this exercise for a large set of non-banking ﬁrms. The
reason we use quarters as our time increment is that we want to relate changes in credit spreads
to changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc information, which is only available over quarterly intervals.
The data for our analysis comes from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) on
corporate bond characteristics matched to the National Association of Security Commissioners
(NAIC) database on bond transactions for the period January 1994 through December 1999. The
FISD database contains issue and issuer-speciﬁc information such as coupon rate and frequency,
maturity, credit rating, callability, puttability, convertability, and sinking fund provisions, on
all US corporate bonds maturing in 1990 or later. The NAIC database consists of all transac-
tions in 1994-1999 by life insurance, property and casualty insurance, and Health Maintenance
Organization companies as distributed by Warga (2000). This database is an alternative to
the no longer available Warga (1998) database used by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin
(2001) and Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2000, 2001) and is the one used by Campbell
and Taksler (2002).
We ﬁrst record the transaction prices and all the characteristics of each traded bond. We
separate all data into two broad categories of banking and non-banking ﬁrms. For banks we
have 18,776 trades across 185 diﬀerent banks. The number of trades and ﬁrms are shown in the
ﬁrst two columns of Panel A of Table I. For non-banks we have 240,876 trades involving 3,266
diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Our ﬁrst screen eliminates all bonds other than ﬁxed-rate US dollar denominated bonds in
the industrial, banking, and services sectors that have no derivative features. In particular we
focus on bonds that are non-callable, non-puttable, non-convertible, not part of a unit (e.g.
sold with warrants) and have no sinking fund. We also exclude bonds with asset-backed and
credit enhancement features. This ensures that our credit spreads relate more directly to the
creditworthiness of the issuer rather than the collateral. We eliminate non investment-grade
4debt because insurance company regulation often limits or prohibits these ﬁrms’ purchases of
such issues. We use only quote prices. Further, we eliminate all data that have inconsistent or
suspicious issue/dates/maturity/coupon etc., or otherwise does not look reasonable.
Table I Here
Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A of Table I show the number of trades and ﬁrms that remain
after applying this ﬁlter for banks and non-banks. For banks we are left with 14,660 trades
over 144 diﬀerent banks. This culling of data represents just over 20% of the transactions. For
non-banks we are left with 26,808 transactions from 246 ﬁrms. This represents a much more
dramatic culling of data by a factor of 88%.
A major reason for this diﬀerence is that the number of non-banks issuing convertible, callable
or puttable debt and debt with sinking fund provisions is much higher than the number of banks
issuing such debt. G¨ untay, Prabhala and Unal (2002) document that over 80% of debt issues
in the 1980s were callable, but less than 50% of new issues in the 1990s were callable. They
explain that this could be due to the rapid growth in over-the-counter derivative products. They
document that ﬁrms with more experience in derivative products were more likely to abandon
issuing callable debt. Their result explains the higher proportion of straight debt issued by
banks, who clearly have more experience with derivative products.
Our second screen eliminates all those ﬁrm-quarter combinations for which we had less than
6 trades for the quarter. The reason for this screen is to ensure that we could obtain reliable
estimates for the credit spread curve for a ﬁrm at the end of each quarter. For banks, this left
us with 9,167 transactions over 81 diﬀerent banks, while for non-banks we were left with 16,480
transactions from 211 diﬀerent ﬁrms. Columns 5 and 6 of Panel A of Table I show the resulting
number of ﬁrms and transactions using this criterion. 62% of the bank as well as non-bank
transactions survived this culling. By eliminating data from ﬁrms with infrequent transactions
in any quarter we run the risk of biasing our results against ﬁnding liquidity premia. However,
in order to estimate credit-spread curves at the end of each quarter we do need a minimum
number of data points.
Our third and ﬁnal screen removes the transactions from ﬁrms where we could not collect
ﬁrm speciﬁc risk measures. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk data are collected from the Federal Reserve
Bank Y-9 and call reports for banks and BHCs, and from Compustat quarterly for the non-
banks. We needed data to compute all our ﬁrm risk measures for all the 24 quarters of our
data set and one quarter before our data begins and one quarter after it ends. This enables
us to compute the changes in ﬁrm risk ratios that will be used as independent variables in our
regression on credit spread changes. The exact nature of these risk measures will be discussed
later. For banks that left us with our ﬁnal database of 6,590 transactions from 50 ﬁrms. For
non-banks we have 9,703 transactions from 133 ﬁrms.
5We are, ﬁnally, left with a database that contains the transaction prices, trading dates, and
the speciﬁc terms of SNDs, ordered by ﬁrm and by quarter, and separated according to whether
the ﬁrm is a banking or a non-banking ﬁrm. This is the ﬁrst of the three databases we use in
this paper. Panels B and C of Table 1 provide details on maturity and coupon of SNDs as well
as ﬁrm ratings of our ﬁnal sample of banking and non-banking ﬁrms.
For banking ﬁrms in our ﬁnal sample, the highest proportions of SNDs issued have maturities
between 1 and 5 years, and between 5 and 10 years (together around 60 percent of all SNDs),
almost half the number of SNDs have coupons between 6 and 7 percent, and almost all the
banking ﬁrms have an examiner rating of 1 or 2 (the top ratings). The descriptive statistics for
the bonds issued by the non-banking ﬁrms are roughly similar to those issued by the banking
ﬁrms. However, there is more dispersion in the ﬁrm ratings of the non-banking ﬁrms with only
11 percent of the ﬁrms in our ﬁnal sample have a rating of AA and above.
Our second database comprises daily estimates of the zero riskless yield curve. Unlike cor-
porate bonds, there is much information on treasury rates. To set this up, we use the weekly
3-month, 6-month, one, two, three, ﬁve, seven, ten, twenty and thirty year Constant Maturity
Treasury rate data from January 1993 to December 2000 obtained from the web site of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use a cubic smoothing spline procedure to extract par
rates for every six-month interval, beyond six months and the short three-month rate. From
this, we get the zero rates for every six-month period. The ﬁnal saved output for each day is
the annualized continuously compounded yields for the three and six month rates, and the one,
two, three, ﬁve, seven ten, twenty and thirty year maturities.
Our third database consists of quarterly data on ﬁrm speciﬁc risk ratios, market variables,
liquidity variables, as well as stock returns and ﬁrm ratings. The exact nature of this database
is discussed in section 3.
2 Extracting Credit Spreads
Our goal is to use actual price information on all bonds of each ﬁrm that traded in a particular
quarter, together with concurrent riskless term structures, to extract a term structure of credit
spreads for each ﬁrm at the end of each quarter. In order to accomplish this we set up a model
of credit spreads for a ﬁrm that has the following properties. First, given the limited data on
trades of all debt issues of a ﬁrm in a particular quarter, the dynamics for credit spreads have to
be relatively simple. In particular, we only require that the short credit spread process for each
ﬁrm be mean reverting, correlated with interest rates, and have constant volatility over each
quarter. In contrast, given the abundance of time series data on the yields of the term structure,
the model for riskless bonds can be fairly rich, exploiting the many well known properties of
6the dynamics of the riskless yield curve. In this section we will establish our 3-factor model
for pricing risky debt, describe the estimation process for the parameters of the riskless term
structure and for the credit spreads, and present the results.
2.1 Pricing Risky Bonds
Valuation models of defaultable claims can be classiﬁed into two types, namely structural and
reduced form models. The ﬁrst is based on the structural notion that default occurs when
the ﬁrms assets drops below its liabilities. In this approach, default is typically predictable
and unless jumps in the underlying value of the ﬁrm are introduced, or errors in observing the
underlying state variables, the resulting credit spreads on short term debt are generally observed
to be much smaller than those observed in practice. The second approach dispenses with the
idea of endogenous bankruptcy and treat defaults as a jump process with an exogenous intensity.
Models such as Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) and others, follow this
approach, and are now routinely used to price defaultable claims.
We adopt a reduced form model where the default process is modeled directly as surprise
stopping times. In particular let h(t) be the hazard rate process, with h(t)dt representing the risk
neutral probability of defaulting in the interval (t,t+dt). We follow Duﬃe and Singleton (1999)
and deﬁne recovery, yr(τ), at the time of default, τ, to be a fraction, φ say, of the pre-default
value of the bond. That is:
yr(τ)=φG(τ ,T),
where G(t,T) is the price of the zero coupon bond that promises to pay $1 at date T.D u ﬃ e
and Singleton consolidate the hazard rate with the loss rate and deﬁne the instantaneous credit
spread, s(t), to be:
s(t)=h(t)(1 − φ(t)).
They show that the price of a risky zero coupon bond can be obtained by pretending the bond





















where P(t,T) is the date t price of a riskless bond that pays $1 at date T. Pricing risky coupon
bonds follows by treating it as an appropriate portfolio of risky zero coupon bonds. Speciﬁcally,
consider a risky ﬁrm that promises to pay $cj at times tj where j =1 ,...,n. Then, the value
















In order to establish a model for the credit spread curve at any date, sp(t;·), then, requires the
speciﬁcation of the dynamics for the interest rate process, r(t), and the instantaneous spread,
s(t). Under the equivalent martingale measure, Q say, we assume the interest rate evolves
according to a two factor double mean reverting model. Speciﬁcally,
dr(t)=[ θ(t)+u(t) − ar(t)]dt + σrdwr(t)( 4 )
du(t)=−bu(t)dt + σudwu, (5)
where E
Q
t [dwr(t)dwu(t)] = ρurdt. θ(t) may be chosen to make the model consistent with the
prices of all zero coupon bond prices. u(t) is a component of the long run average mean of the
short rate. It is stochastic and mean reverts to zero at rate b. The parameters a, b, σr, σu,a r e
constants and dwr(t)a n ddwu(t) are standard Wiener processes, with correlation ρurdt.T h i s
two-factor model has been considered by Hull and White (1993) who show that the date t price
of a zero coupon riskless bond with face value $1 that matures at date t + m, has the following
form:
P(t,t + m)=e−A(t,m)−B(m)r(t)−C(m)u(t),


















and A(t,m) depends on whether θ(t) is chosen to be a constant, or whether it is chosen so as to












uC2(v)+σrσuρruB(v)C(v), and for the latter case, the expression is
provided in the Appendix of Hull and White (1993). Notice that the continuously compounded
yield to maturity is an aﬃne function of the state variables. This model has been well studied.
For example, Jegadeesh and Pennacchi (1996) evaluate how well this model performs for pricing
Eurodollar Futures contracts. Further, a simple application of Ito’s rule shows that the volatility
structure of forward rates takes on a humped function of maturity. This property is consistent
with empirical evidence on forward rates, and this type of model has been considered for pricing
caps and swaptions.5
5Examples include Ritchken and Iyuan (2001), and Babbs and Nowman (1999).
8In order to price risky bonds for a particular ﬁrm we require the joint dynamics of the
instantaneous credit spread, s(t), with the above interest rate state variables. Under the risk
neutral measure, our full model for pricing risky bonds is driven by the three-factor model:
dr(t)=[ θ(t)+u(t) − ar(t)]dt + σrdwr(t)( 6 )
du(t)=−bu(t)dt + σudwu(t)( 7 )
ds(t)=[ α0 − α1s(t)]dt + σsdws(t), (8)
where E
Q
t [dwr(t)dwu(t)] = ρurdt, E
Q
t [dwu(t)dws(t)] = ρusdt,a n dE
Q
t [dwr(t)dws(t)] = ρrsdt.
Standard no arbitrage conditions for pricing a risky bond leads to a second order partial diﬀer-




















































In the model the credit spread does not explicitly depend on the riskless term structure.
However, the functions D(·)a n dK(·) depend on all the interest rate process parameters. De-
pending on these parameters the spread curve can be upward sloping, downward sloping or
hump shaped. While this model is analytic and fairly ﬂexible, it does suﬀer from the possibility
that spreads can become negative. However with appropriately chosen parameter values the
likelihood of this possibility should be small. Our objective is to estimate the spread curve
sp(t,·) for each ﬁrm at the beginning of each quarter, t.
92.2 Estimation Technique
Our state variables (rt,u t,s t) are not directly observable. We do have a rich set of riskless terms
structure data which allows us to measure, with error, functions of (rt,u t).
With regard to risky bond prices, trade information is rather infrequent. To facilitate esti-
mation using discretely observed data we separate the estimation problem into two phases. In
the ﬁrst phase we estimate the riskless term structure parameters using a time series of cress
sections of riskless bond prices, imposing both cross sectional model restrictions and conditional
time series restrictions. We accomplish this using a Kalman ﬁlter approach.
While in principle, the Kalman ﬁlter approach could be used for the entire system of riskless
and risky bonds, the amount of data available for estimating the risky bonds is small, and the
resulting credit spread parameter estimates, for each quarter, would depend too heavily on the
initial priors that need to be speciﬁed. To avoid this possible bias we adopted an empirical
Bayes estimation procedure used in non-linear mixed eﬀects models. This approach produces
consistent estimators, and is very close in intent to the Kalman ﬁltering approach, where the
underlying process is not observable.
2.2.1 Estimating Parameters From Riskless Bond Prices
To facilitate estimation using discretely observed data, we rewrite the riskless bond model as
a discrete time state space system. Notice, that in order to do this we need to specify the
dynamics of the state variables under the data generating measure. This requires speciﬁcation
of the market prices of risk. We shall assume that the market price of interest rate risk, λr(t),
is proportional to r(t), and that the market price of central tendency risk, λu(t), is zero. This
latter assumption is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Jegadeesh and Pennacchi (1996).
Finally, we will assume the market price of credit spread risk, λs(t) is proportional to s(t). The
full dynamics of the state variables under the data generating measure is then given by:
dr(t)=[ θ(t)+u(t) − ar(t)]dt + σrdwr(t) (11)
du(t)=−bu(t)dt + σudwu(t) (12)
ds(t)=[ α0 − α1s(t)]dt + σsdws(t), (13)
where EP
t [dwr(t)dwu(t)] = ρurdt, EP
t [dwu(t)dws(t)] = ρusdt, EP
t [dwr(t)dws(t)] = ρrsdt,
a = a + λrσr,a n dα1 = α1 + λsσs.
Under this process, the joint distribution of the riskless interest rate state variables {r(t),u(t)}
is bivariate normal when viewed from any earlier date. With discretely observed data, we can
write:













































































Equation (14) deﬁnes the state transition equation. If at date t, we observe the prices of bonds
with maturities m1, m2,m3,...,mn, then the n yields can be written in matrix form as
Yt = G + HSt +Υ t, (15)
where
Y  
t =( yt(m1),y t(m2),...,y t(mn))
G  =( A(m1),A(m2),...,A(mn))
H  =

B(m1) B(m2) ... B(mn)
C(m1) C(m2) ... C(mn)

,
and the measurement error in the yields, Υt ∼ N(0,σ2
ΥIn).
Equations (14) and (15) constitute a state space system whose parameters can be estimated
by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is estimated recursively using a Kalman ﬁlter
as follows.
11We ﬁrst need an estimate of the initial state vector, S0, and its variance covariance matrix,
R0, say. More generally, assume at date t, St and Rt are given. Viewed from date t,o u r
predictions for date t + h are:
ˆ St+h|t = γ0(h)+γ1(h)St
ˆ Rt+h|t = γ1(h)Rtγ1(h)  + Q(h).
The innovation vector, ηt+h, and its variance, Vt+h, are computed as:
ηt+h = Yt+h − (G + H ˆ St+h|t)
Vt+h = σ2
ΥIn + H ˆ Rt+h|tH .
The date t forecasts are then blended with the date t+h innovations, to yield the updates values
for St+h and its variance Vt+h as follows:
St+h = ˆ St+h|t + ˆ Rt+h|tH V −1
t+hηt+h
Rt+h = ˆ Rt+h|t − ˆ Rt+h|tH V −1
t+hH ˆ Rt+h|t.
After computing the innovation vector ηt,a n dVt for each date using this recursive procedure,












The optimal parameter set corresponds to the set that maximizes this function. This optimiza-
tion procedure is solved using numerical methods.
2.2.2 Estimation of Credit Spread Parameters
Consider a particular ﬁrm and assume that over a particular quarter there are K observable bond
trades. Let t1 <t 2 <...<t K represent the trade dates and let ai represent the actual bond
price at date ti, i =1 ,2,...,K. Notice that a ﬁrm may have multiple bonds outstanding so that
the coupons and maturity dates at diﬀerent trade dates might vary. Let ˆ ai be our theoretical
risky bond price computed at date ti, conditional on knowledge of the state variables at date ti.
From equation (3) each risky coupon bond can be viewed as an appropriate portfolio of risky zero
coupon bonds. Further, each zero risky bond is priced as a riskless zero coupon bond multiplied
by a factor that depends on maturity, the state variable, s(t), and on all the parameters, some
of which we have estimated. The parameters that remain are Φ = {α0,α 1,λ s,ρ rs,ρ us,σ s}.
Let S represent the path of the state variable over the K trading dates. That is, S =
{s(t1),s(t2),...,s(tK)}. Further let:
ˆ A  =( ˆ a1,ˆ a2,..., ˆ aK)
A  =( a1,a 2,...,a K).
12Let SSE(Φ,s(0),S) represent the sum of squared errors between bond price residuals given the
initial spread, s(0), the path, S, and the parameters in Φ. Our goal will be to choose estimates
that minimize the expected sum of squared errors, where the expectation is taken over all possible
paths. Notice that the residuals will be correlated due to the fact that the time series of state
variables is generated by an Ornstein Uhlenbeck process. Let ΣK be the K × K covariance








where tij = Max[ti,t j]a n dtij = Min[ti,t j]. Consistent least squares estimates are then gener-
ated by minimizing the following expected weighted sums of squares.
Mins0,ΦE[(A − ˆ A) Σ−1
K (A − ˆ A)]
As discussed earlier, a Kalman ﬁltering estimation approach could have been used for the
entire system of interest rates and credit spreads, avoiding this two-phase approach. If we
estimated the joint process of interest rates and credit spreads, then the resulting interest rate
parameter estimates would diﬀer in each quarter, depending on which ﬁrm we adopted. We
wanted to use the same interest rate parameter estimates for all the ﬁrms. Second, the Kalman
ﬁlter is a recursive, unbiased least squares estimator of a Gaussian random signal. Our smoothed
credit spread parameters are also least squares estimates, but do not require priors for the state
variable. The Kalman ﬁlter approach can be viewed as a Bayesian approach where the ﬁlter
propagates the conditional probability density, conditional on knowledge of data coming from
noisy measurements. When there are few measurements, then the ﬁnal estimates can be sensitive
to the initial priors. If we do not want to specify initial priors, then the smoothed estimates, like
the least squares estimates derived above, are more appropriate. Finally, notice that when we
estimate the interest rate parameters we use a time series of cross sectional bond prices, imposing
both cross sectional and conditional time series restrictions, with constant θ, in the drift term
of equations (6) and (11). However, when we estimate the credit spread, we use equation (9),
where the riskless discount bond price is taken as data, rather then the estimated value. In this
case, our credit spread at any date t is measured using all the riskless term structure at date t
as data. Moreover, all ﬁrms at date t, measure their credit spreads relative to the same riskless
term structure at date t, and use the same interest rate parameter values.6
2.3 Model Outputs
Figure 1 shows the one-week ahead prediction errors of the riskless yield-to maturities. In
particular, we present a box whiskers plot of all the prediction errors for each maturity.
6Our model is similar to that of Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2001), except our estimated credit spreads at all
dates fully incorporate information on all riskless yields at each trade date.
13Figure 1 Here
The model displays almost no bias in estimating yields, and the majority of predictions
provided by the two-factor model fall within twenty basis points of the observed values. The
average absolute one week prediction yield errors is 10.44 basis points.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of percentage errors in bond prices produced by the models
for all banks. The percentage errors are bucketed by the underlying maturity of the bond, and
the results presented in the form of box and whisker plots. The ﬁve maturity buckets correspond
to: shorter than 2 years, 2 − 5y e a r s ,5− 10 years, 10 − 20 years, and greater than 20 years.
Figure 2 Here
The box and whisker plots reveal that the interquartile ranges for percentage errors are
symmetrically distributed about zero for all maturity contracts. The interquartile range extends
for about 2.5%. In aggregate, the mean (median) pricing error was 0.22% (0.16%). The mean
of the absolute percentage errors was 2.2%, while the median of the absolute percentage errors
was 1.2%. These results indicate that the model is ﬁtting actual data remarkably well with
no obvious biases along the maturity spectrum. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the box
whisker plots for our sample of non-banks.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of average percentage errors in bond prices by bank in our
data set.
Figure 3 Here
As can be seen, the average percentage pricing error per bank is close to zero, and there are
very few observations where the average deviates from 0.5%. This indicates that the estimation
of credit spread curves for banks has indeed eﬀectively incorporated the information on bond
prices.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the time series of quarterly 3-year credit spreads of randomly
selected banks and non-banking ﬁrms. Over this time period credit spreads, on average were
rising slightly, but, as the ﬁgures show, there was substantial variation over time and among
ﬁrms. In general, the range of credit spreads for the non-banking ﬁrms was greater than the
range of credit spreads for banks. The right hand panel shows typical plots of the quarterly
changes in 3-year credit spreads. The plots reveal that credit spread changes can be fairly
volatile, with swings of over 50 basis points in a quarter, being possible.
Figure 4 Here
14Panels B and C of Table I showed the distribution of maturities, coupons and ratings for our
sample of banking and non-banking ﬁrms. Given the distribution of maturities, we have chosen,
for the following analysis, to focus on representative maturities for credit spreads of 3 and 7
years. Interestingly, the 3 and 7 year credit spreads often move in opposite directions. For our
bank data, for over 17% of the time, a decrease in one of the two spreads is accompanied by an
increase in the other. This simple statistic reveals a limitation in previous studies, where credit
spread curves were not explicitly extracted. In the analysis that follows our dependent variable
will, therefore, be the 3 or 7 year credit spread level or its change. In addition, since the slope
of the credit spread curve, and the change in the slope may be informative about the level and
change in ﬁrm risk variables, we also include the slope, deﬁned as the 7-year minus the 3-year
credit spread, in our analyses.
3 Explanatory Variables
As described above, we have used a 3-factor model to construct credit-spread curves. One can
view our use of this model as a calibrating device that constructs credit-spread curves such
that they ﬁt the observed transaction prices well. And, as evidenced by Figure 2, the 3-factor
model ﬁts our data remarkably well with no obvious biases along the maturity spectrum (see
Figure 2). However, the credit spreads may be capturing default probability, anticipated recov-
ery rates given default, liquidity or risk aversion eﬀects. The magnitude of credit spreads could
ﬂuctuate according to changes in market and business cycle conditions, or due to bond liquidity
factors and, of course, due to changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc variables. Some authors have parame-
terized the instantaneous credit spread as a function, usually aﬃne, of candidate economic and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc state variables and then directly estimated the eﬀects of these variables. Examples
of this approach include Jarrow and Yildirim (2002), and Bakshi, Madan and Zhang (2001).
Unfortunately, the number of trades that survived our rigorous screening process at the in-
dividual ﬁrm level is rather limited. So, from a practical perspective, it was not possible to
include many state variables. Indeed, even those papers that parameterize credit spreads as a
function of candidate state variables limit themselves to considering only a few state variables.
Jarrow and Yildirim (2002) use only interest rates as the state variable while Bakshi, Madan
and Zhang (2001), consider a variety of models with no more than 2 state variables.
Therefore, given the data constraint, we adopt an approach that is similar to Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein and Martin (2001). We ﬁrst extract credit spreads that ﬁt the observed transaction
prices well, and then relate credit spreads changes to a host of possible explanatory variables.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to consider a large set of potential explanatory
variables for credit spreads, without being limited by the number of eligible transactions data
per ﬁrm per quarter.
15Our main concern now is to try and isolate the factors that drive changes in credit spread
curve over successive quarters for banks. To address this, we identify three types of variables
that can aﬀect credit spreads. These are ﬁrm speciﬁc risk characteristics, market wide factors,
and liquidity factors.
3.1 Firm Speciﬁc Risk Characteristics
The ﬁrm speciﬁc risk variables, their anticipated eﬀect on credit spreads, and data sources are
summarized below.
Firm Speciﬁc Risk Characteristics for Banks and Non-Banks




ROA (Net Income Before Taxes decreases Call Reports and
and Extraordinary Items)/ Federal Reserve Board
Total Assets Y9 Reports
Loan Assets Loan Assets/Total Assets increases
Non Performing ( Loans past due 30-89 days increases
Loans + Loans due 90 days
+ Non accrual loans)/
Loans and leases net of unearned income
Net charge-oﬀs (Charge-oﬀs - recoveries)/loan assets increases
Leverage Total Assets/Total Equity Capital increases
Non-Banks
ROA (Operating Income Before Depreciation)/ decreases Compustat
Total Assets
Interest Coverage (Operating Income Before Depreciation)/ decreases
Interest Expense
Current Ratio Current Assets/Current Liabilities decreases
Leverage (Total Assets- Stockholder Equity)/ increases
Stockholder Equity
Market to (Total Shares × Closing Share Price)/ decreases
Book Ratio Stockholder Equity
Let Fi(t) represent a 5 vector of these 5 ﬁrm speciﬁc variables for ﬁrm i at the end of quarter
t,a n d∆ Fi(t) a 5 vector that contains the change in these ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables for ﬁrm i over
the tth quarter.
163.2 Market Variables
The market variables, their anticipated eﬀect on credit spreads, and data sources are summarized
below.
Market Variables
Variable Source of Data As Variable
Increases
Credit Spreads
Growth Rate in Industrial Production St Louis Fed. web-site decreases
S&P buy and hold return CRSP decreases
5-year Treasury yields St. Louis Fed. web-site decreases
Slope of Yield Curve ( 10 Year - 2 Year) St. Louis Fed. web-site decreases
VIX Index CBOE web-site increases
Growth in Industrial Production is indicative of economic growth. Hence, ceteris paribus,
higher growth should translate into lower credit spreads. Similarly, if the S&P 500 return is high,
individual ﬁrms are likely to be prospering. According to structural models of the ﬁrm, such
as Merton (1974), optimistic expectations beneﬁt stock prices, reduce the likelihood of default,
and lower credit spreads.
Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Duﬀee (1998), among others, ﬁnd that treasury yields are
negatively correlated with changes in credit spreads. Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) show that
increase in the slope of treasury curve is negatively correlated with changes in credit spreads.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) use the slope as a proxy for expectations on future
short rates and an indication of overall economic health.
As ﬁrm volatility increases, the probability of default increases, and the credit spread in-
creases. Since many of the ﬁrms we investigate do not have publically traded options, we cannot
observe their implied volatilities. We use, as a market measure of the relative uncertainty in
the economy, the VIX index. This is a weighted average of eight implied volatilities of near the
money options on the S&P 100 index.
Let M(t) represent a 5 vector of these 5 market variables at the end of quarter t,a n d∆ M(t)
a 5 vector that contains the change in these variables over the tth quarter. The second entry of
∆M(t) represents the actual return on the S&P 500 over the quarter.
173.3 Liquidity Variables
We use 4 liquidity variables, summarized below.
Liquidity Variables
Variable Description Source of As Variable
Data Increases
Spreads
Relative Trade (Number of trades in quarter for this ﬁrm)/ NAIC decreases
Frequency Average number of trades over all ﬁrms for this quarter
TED Spread 1 month ED rate - 1 month Treasury rate St. Louis Fed. increases
New Issue A dummy variable recording FISD -
if the ﬁrm issued new debt in the quarter
Relative Trade Size (Average dollar trade size for ﬁrm in quarter)/ NAIC increases
Average trade size over all ﬁrms in the quarter
An increase in relative trade frequency for a ﬁrm in a quarter indicates that this ﬁrm’s
bonds have become more liquid compared to the average bond liquidity in the market, and
credit spreads might decline.
Campbell and Taksler (2002) use the TED spread as a variable that measures liquidity. As
the TED spread narrows, the liquidity premiums should shrink. A wider spread, indicating a
ﬂight to liquidity, should lead to an increase in the required compensation for holding corporate
bonds.
The New Issue dummy variable controls for the fact that new issues may be priced diﬀerently,
thereby aﬀecting changes in credit spreads in that quarter for that ﬁrm.
The Size of Trade variable controls for the fact that a few large trades could impact spreads
diﬀerently to a number of smaller trades.
Let Li(t) represent a 4 vector of these 4 ﬁrm speciﬁc variables for ﬁrm i at the end of quarter
t,a n d∆ Li(t) a 4 vector that contains the change in these ﬁrm speciﬁc variables for ﬁrm i over
the tth quarter. Notice that the third entry of ∆Li(t) can be 0 if issues occurred in successive
quarters; it is 1 if there is a new issue in this quarter but not in the previous quarter, and it is
−1 if there was an issue in the last quarter but not in this quarter.
184 Market Monitoring
4.1 The Determinants of Credit Spread Levels
First, we want to establish the relative importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk variables, market variables
and liquidity variables in explaining the levels of credit spreads.
Let Sk
i (t) represent a particular k-year credit spread. Pooling all ﬁrms together, we initially
assume:
Sk





where the beta values measure the sensitivity to the independent variables but are not ﬁrm
dependent, and the blocks of independent variables are deﬁned earlier.
We regress the 3 and 7-year credit spreads on these 3 blocks of explanatory variables across
all banking ﬁrms and all quarters, and then, as robustness checks, we repeat the regressions
on subsets of the data broken down by: banks-BHCs, ratings, size (measured in terms of total
assets), leverage, and proﬁtablility (measured by ROA).
The reason for looking at banks and BHCs separately is that bank issued debt has a higher
priority claim on the bank’s assets in liquidation than BHC issued debt. An unresolved issue
in the SND literature is whether it matters if the risky debt is issued at the bank level or the
bank holding company level. In addition, banks are not subject to U.S. bankruptcy laws, and,
in most cases, FDIC is named the receiver bank. BHCs, on the other hand, are subject to
U.S. bankruptcy laws. Segregation on size takes into account the “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF)
eﬀect. Explicit TBTF policies in the 1980s undermined the incentives of uninsured depositors to
monitor the ﬁrm (see O’Hara and Shaw (1990)). This eﬀect is supposed to have come down after
the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act in 1991. However,
the market still perceives the largest banking ﬁrms to be TBTF, particularly when there are
complex derivative books with master netting agreements to contend with. For instance, the
TBTF policy was materially reinforced in the handling of the Long Term Capital Management’s
demise in the late 1990s. Examiners can also inﬂuence the risk taking behavior of banks. Higher
rated banks may not feel the same pressure from regulators to control risk taking. Hence,
the eﬀect of ﬁrm speciﬁc risk changes on changes in credit spreads may depend on the bank’s
examiner rating. Segregation by leverage follows from the accepted rationale that the risk of
SND is higher for more levered ﬁrms, although banking ﬁrms, in general, are more levered than
the non-banking ﬁrms. Finally, we segregate by proﬁtability because the risk of SND may be
viewed as higher for less proﬁtable ﬁrms.
To determine the marginal contribution of each block on the levels of credit spreads, we
conduct a series of partial F tests on the 3 blocks of independent variables. Table II shows the
partial F statistics and the associated p values for each block of explanatory variables, ﬁrst for
19the case when the dependent variable is the 3-year credit spread and then for the 7-year credit
spread.
Table II Here
Both panels of Table II show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk and market variables are important in
explaining credit spread levels, in the aggregate across all banking ﬁrms, and when the full
sample is divided in terms of ﬁrm type, examiner rating, size, leverage and proﬁtability.
However, while the above result replicates previous results using levels of credit spreads,
our main purpose is to examine the relative importance of each set of independent variables in
explaining changes in credit spreads. If credit spreads are to act as a monitoring device, then
changes in ﬁrm risk variables should immediately be reﬂected into a changing credit spread
curve.
4.2 The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes
We regress changes in credit spreads on changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, changes in market variables
and changes in liquidity factors over all ﬁrm-quarters using the following regression model:
∆Sk
i (t)=β0 + βk 
S Sk






i (t) represent the change in a particular k-year credit spread over the tth quarter for
ﬁrm i. In this speciﬁcation, since credit spreads are mean-reverting, we also permit their changes
to depend on current levels.
As before, we conduct a series of partial F tests on the 3 blocks of independent variables to
assess the marginal contribution provided by each block. Table III shows the partial F statistics,
the associated p-values for each block of explanatory variables, and the adjusted R2 values, for
the full sample and for the various subgroups.
Table III Here
The results for changes in 3-year credit spreads are diﬀerent from those for level eﬀects in
Table II. Changes in credit spreads do not reﬂect changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risks, after controlling
for changes in market-wide variables and liquidity variables.
Notice that all our market-wide variables and one liquidity variable, the TED spread, depend
on calendar time alone. We, therefore, run our regression model again using quarterly dummy
variables as the independent variables instead of our set of 5 market variables and the 1 liquidity




i (t − 1) + βk 
F ∆Fi(t)+βk 
L ∆Li(t)+βk
MT +  k
i(t), (18)
20where T is a vector of size 24 (one for each quarter that our data spans), that replaces the market
block, and the liquidity block is now a vector of size 3 instead of 4. This speciﬁcation allows us
to capture all the time ﬁxed eﬀects, including changes in the market conditions from quarter to
quarter. For instance, our data sample spans the Long Term Capital Management crisis, and
the Russian crisis, neither of which are represented by a speciﬁc market variable. Time ﬁxed
eﬀects dummy variables help capture all such calendar time diﬀerences, thereby allowing us to
detect any statistically signiﬁcant relationship between changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and
changes in credit spreads more cleanly.
As shown in Panel B of Table III, when we reestimate the model controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects,
our results do not change.
Similar results are obtained when using the 7-year credit spread, as shown in Table IV. We
do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant relationship between changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables
and changes in credit spreads both for the full sample and for the sub samples.
Table IV Here
We are, however, able to ﬁnd a strong statistically signiﬁcant relationship between changes
in the market variables and changes in credit spreads. Changes in market conditions appear to
inﬂuence changes in credit spreads of banking ﬁrms signiﬁcantly. To determine changes in which
speciﬁc market variables aﬀect changes in credit spreads, we need to look at the signiﬁcance
of the individual beta coeﬃcients. Table V shows the standardized beta coeﬃcients and the
associated t statistics for all the individual variables comprising the block of market variables
when equation model (17) is estimated over all the data and over the various subgroups.
Table V Here
Changes in the 5-year treasury yields is the single most important determinant of changes in
3-year credit spreads, while growth in industrial production and changes in the 5-year treasury
yield are the two most important determinants in the changes in the 7-year credit spreads. The
signs of the coeﬃcients are as expected.
4.3 The Slope of the Credit Spread Curve
While we have found a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between credit spread levels and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk, we failed to ﬁnd one between changes in credit spreads and changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk. This being the case, monitoring changes in credit spreads of SND issued by banking ﬁrms
may not yield information on how ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk has changed. However, the slope of the credit
21spread curve, and the change in the slope, could reﬂect changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risk variables.
Therefore, we examine whether there exist statistically signiﬁcant relationships between credit
spread slope and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk and between changes in credit-spread slopes and changes in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk.









where SLi(t) is the slope as deﬁned by 7 year credit spread minus 3 year credit spread, S7
i (t)−
S3
i (t). In equation (19), we allow for the slope to depend on the level of the 3 year credit spread.
We specify the change regression as:







where ∆SLi(t) is the change in the credit-spread slope.
Panel A of Table VI summarizes the results for the level regressions. The results demonstrate
that ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk factors do determine the slope of the credit spread curve. Interestingly,
market and liquidity variables are not statistically signiﬁcant. This result raises the possibility
that changes in the slope may respond to changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risk variables.
Table VI Here
Panel B of Table VI, however, does not conﬁrm this result. Controlling for changes in market
and liquidity variables, the reported partial F statistics reveal that changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risk
variables are not linearly related to changes in credit-spread slopes. These results hold for our
entire group, as well as for all 10 subgroups.
In summary, then, we are unable to ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and changes in credit spreads or changes in credit-spread slope.
4.4 More Robustness Checks
It may be that credit spread changes depend heavily on the levels of current ﬁrm speciﬁc levels
as well as the changes in the levels. For example, it is possible that a leverage change from 60
percent to 70 percent has a diﬀerent ﬁrm risk change implication than a change from 10 percent
to 20 percent, although each change is 10 percent. To account for such diﬀerences, we could
include the lagged ﬁrm risk level in our regression equation, as well as interaction eﬀects between
levels and changes. In Table VII we report the results of the following regression:
22∆Sk
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The results are shown in Table VII. We cannot ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and changes in credit spreads or changes in credit-spread slope.
Table VII Here
As a second robustness check, we recompute changes to ﬁrm speciﬁc variables in a slightly
diﬀerent way. We redeﬁne changes in ﬁrm risk ratios to mean changes in the numerator that
occurred during a quarter divided by the average level in the denominator. For instance, change
in ROA is now measured as the change in the net income before taxes and extraordinary items
from the beginning of the quarter to the end of the quarter in question divided by the average
of the beginning of the quarter total assets and the end of the quarter total assets. We regress
changes in the 3 year and 7 year credit spreads on changes in the redeﬁned ﬁrm risk variables,
liquidity variables and market variables, and ﬁnd that the explanatory power of changes in ﬁrm
risk variables is insigniﬁcant.7
4.5 Impact of Stock Prices and Ratings Information
It must be noted that regulators have other indicators of bank risk changes, in addition to credit
spreads changes. These are stock returns and changes in the examination rating of a banking
ﬁrm (the CAMELS and BOPEC ratings). For SND to have a market monitoring beneﬁt, changes
in credit spreads or credit spread slopes must reﬂect changes in ﬁrm risk over and above that
reﬂected in stock prices and examination ratings. So far we have not required that market
monitoring beneﬁts of SND satisfy this additional requirement, and hence we may have biased
our models in favor of ﬁnding relationships between changes in credit spreads and changes in
ﬁrm speciﬁc risk variables.
The reason for not including stock returns from the start of our analyses is that stock
returns from the CRSP database are available only for a subset of our sample of banking ﬁrms.
In particular, stock returns are available for almost all BHCs but are available only for a small
fraction of banks in our sample. The reason for not including examination rating changes from
the start of our analyses is that full scope bank and BHC examinations are conducted once a
7The F statistics (p values) of the block of changes in ﬁrm risk variables are 1.169 (0.323) and 0.688 (0.633)
when the dependent variables are changes in the 3 year and the 7 year credit spread changes respectively. The
results for the various sub samples are not reported in this paper but are available from the authors.
23year, and the rating assigned to that bank or BHC at the end of the review is, more often than
not, the same as the previous rating. Nevertheless, to check for the robustness of our results,
we include these two control variables and reestimate our regression models.
The control variables and the source of data are shown below:
Control Variables
Variable Source of Data
Buy and Hold Stock Returns CRSP
BOPEC ratings for BHCs Federal Reserve System
CAMEL ratings for banks Federal Reserve System
Average issue rating for each non-banking ﬁrm FISD




Let ∆Ci(t) be a 2 vector of stock return of ﬁrm i in quarter t, and the change in its examination
rating in period t. The rating change variable is either 0 if there is no change, 1 if the change is
an upgrade, and −1 if the change is a downgrade.
When ∆Ci(t) is included as an additional explanatory variable, the results, as expected,
do not change. Changes in ﬁrm risk variables are not reﬂected in changes in credit spreads or
changes in credit spread slopes for banking ﬁrms. These results are shown in Table VIII.
Table VIII Here
The results show that stock returns have signiﬁcant explanatory power over changes in the
3-year credit spreads (standardized beta coeﬃcient = −0.104 and the t-statistic = −2.177, and
so as stock returns increase, credit spreads decrease), but not over changes in the 7-year credit
spreads. Stock returns can also explain changes in credit-spread slopes.
4.6 Common Factors Among Residuals
The explanatory power of our regression models is reasonable. For example, the adjusted R2 for
the model in which changes in the 3 year credit spreads are regressed on changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
liquidity and market variables is 49.2 percent. To understand the nature of the remaining
variation in changes of credit spreads, we conducted a principal components analysis on the
residuals of this regression model. We assigned each residual for a ﬁrm in a quarter to one
24of eight bins, determined by two leverage groups, two proﬁtability (ROA) groups and two size
groups. For each bin we computed an average residual for each quarter, and then extracted
the principal components from the resulting covariance matrix. The ﬁrst principal component
accounted for 35% of the variation, the second for an additional 23%, and the third, a further
17%. This indicates that there may be some additional common factors that are driving changes
in credit spreads that we have not accounted for. However, these factors inﬂuence the credit-
spread changes for all banking ﬁrms systematically. Therefore, a large fraction of the unexplained
variability is systematic, which makes it unlikely that we may have missed accounting for certain
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk variables that would have had explanatory power over changes in credit spreads.
4.7 Are the Results Speciﬁc to Banking Firms?
Our results could be due to the fact that we have examined highly regulated banking ﬁrms.
In this case, it is unclear whether our results hold in general, or only hold for banking ﬁrms.
In other words, we have found that credit spreads changes are inﬂuenced by other factors like
market-wide eﬀects and liquidity factors to such an extent that we are unable to ﬁnd any
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between changes in credit spreads and changes in ﬁrm risk
variables. We wish to examine whether this is true for all ﬁrms in general. To investigate this,
we regress changes in credit spreads on changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risks, changes in liquidity and
changes in market variables, for non-banking ﬁrms. Table IX shows the partial F statistics and
the associated p values for each block of explanatory variables when the dependent variables
are the changes in the 3 and 7 year credit spreads across all ﬁrm-quarters, as well as when we
subdivide the full sample in terms of ﬁrm type (manufacturing or service), credit rating, size,
leverage and proﬁtability.
Table IX Here
We ﬁnd the same result for our sample of non-banking ﬁrms as well: changes in credit spreads
do not reﬂect changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risk changes, after controlling for changes in market-wide
variables and liquidity variables. In summary, changes in credit spreads do not reﬂect changes
in ﬁrm speciﬁc risks, not only for banking ﬁrms but also for non-banking ﬁrms.
5 Preventative Inﬂuence
One reason why changes in credit spreads do not reﬂect changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk charac-
teristics could be that ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk comes down after a bank or BHC issues risky debt. If
investors are able to accurately price risky debt, then a banking ﬁrm will incur increased costs
25of funding if it were to adopt riskier strategies. Due to this market risk monitoring eﬀect, banks
with SND may be less likely to adopt risky strategies in the ﬁrst place. This is the preventative
inﬂuence role of SND. If this were true, then it would be incorrect to state that SND does not
achieve its objective when we ﬁnd that changes in SND credit spreads do not reﬂect changes in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks.
We investigate whether SND has a preventative inﬂuence by examining whether ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risks change signiﬁcantly after a banking ﬁrm issues its ﬁrst SND. Panels A and B of Table X
respectively show the average change in the raw and the matched-adjusted ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk
characteristics from before a ﬁrm ﬁrst issued any subordinated debt to after it does, and the
corresponding t statistics. For this exercise we are limited to 14 banks and 14 BHCs that ﬁrst
issued SND in or after 1988 because all data from the Y-9 and call reports are available only
after 1988. For each bank (BHC) that issues subordinated debt for the ﬁrst time, a matched
portfolio of 10 non-issuing banks (BHCs) is constructed as follows. For each bank (BHC), we
ﬁnd the closest 250 non-issuing banks (BHCs) based on Total Assets (size). From out of these
250 banks (BHCs), we ﬁnd the closest 50 ﬁrms based on leverage. At this stage, we have a set
of 50 non-issuing banks or BHCs for each issuing bank or BHC that are matched to the issuer
in terms of Total Assets and leverage. Next, from out of these 50 banks (BHCs), we ﬁnd the
closest 10 ﬁrms based on ROA. This set of 10 non-issuers (that are closest to the issuer in terms
of Total Assets, Leverage, and ROA in addition to being the same type of ﬁrm (bank or BHC)
and having the same examiner rating in the issuing quarter) form our matched portfolio for that
issuer. We ﬁnd such a set of matched non-issuing ﬁrms for each issuer in our sample.
Table X Here
Table X shows that ﬁrm speciﬁc risk characteristics did not change signiﬁcantly from the
quarter before the issue to the quarter after the issue, from the half year before the issue to the
half year after the issue, and from the year before the issue to the year after the issue, both
on raw basis or on matched-adjusted basis. Thus, SND issues by banking ﬁrms do not seem to
have any preventative inﬂuence.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether risky debt issued by banks and bank holding
companies enhance risk monitoring and help control risk taking. In theory, if investors accurately
understand changes in a ﬁrm’s risk condition and incorporate their assessment promptly into
the prices of risky debt issued by a ﬁrm, then changes in credit spreads should provide useful
information on how ﬁrms-speciﬁc risks have changed. In this way, risky debt enhances risk
26monitoring. However, banks having risky debt may be less likely to adopt risky strategies in
the ﬁrst place, because if they take excessive risks, debt prices may reﬂect the risk taken by the
ﬁrm and make borrowing costlier for the ﬁrm. This is the preventative inﬂuence beneﬁt of risky
debt that serves to control risk taking.
We fail to ﬁnd evidence that risky debt facilitates risk monitoring. Speciﬁcally, there does
not appear to be a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between changes in ﬁrm risk variables
and changes in credit spreads. Therefore, inferring ﬁrm speciﬁc risk changes from changes in
credit spreads is not viable. We check the robustness of our results by splitting our sample by
ﬁrm type, rating, size, leverage, and proﬁtability. The result remains unchanged. We replace
non ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables in our model with time indicator variables to capture all
calendar time eﬀects. The result does not change. We take into account the possibility that
relative changes may matter by including lagged ﬁrm risk variables in our models. In general,
the result does not change. We include stock returns and changes in examination ratings in our
model, and our result still does not change. We ﬁnd changes in credit-spread curve slope are
not good signals of changes in ﬁrm speciﬁc risks as well.
We examine whether the above result obtains because risky debt has the eﬀect of changing
the risk taking behavior of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that neither the raw risk characteristics nor the risk-
matched-ﬁrm adjusted characteristics change signiﬁcantly after a banking ﬁrm ﬁrst issues SND.
Thus, SND does not signiﬁcantly change risk-taking behavior of banking ﬁrms.
Our results strongly question the eﬃcacy of mandating subordinated debt for banking ﬁrms
as we ﬁnd little evidence of risk change signaling beneﬁt or preventative inﬂuence beneﬁt. We
cannot, however, conclude that mandating risky debt for banking ﬁrms serves no purpose. First,
it must be noted that our sample period of 1994 to 1999 spans a relatively quiet period in banking
with few bank failures and strong capital growth, although the Long Term Capital Management
crisis and the Russian crisis did occur during this period. Second, we are forced to analyze those
banking ﬁrms that have voluntarily chosen to issue subordinated debt. Hence, there can be a
self-selection bias inherent in our results. Finally, although we ﬁnd that subordinated debt does
not facilitate monitoring of ﬁrm risk taking, and does not signiﬁcantly change the risk-taking
behavior of banking ﬁrms, subordinated debt still has the beneﬁt of providing an additional
cushion from banking losses for the depositors and FDIC.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst in the banking literature that attempts
to carefully extract the entire credit spread curve for each banking ﬁrm at each point in time,
and to analyze changes in speciﬁc maturity credit spreads as well as changes in credit spread
slopes. In this paper, our focus was to determine whether changes in credit spreads or changes
in credit spread slopes provide information on changes in ﬁrm risk, after controlling for changes
in market and liquidity variables. We could also investigate what the signiﬁcant determinants
of credit spread changes and credit slope changes are, both for the diﬀerent sub samples within
27banking ﬁrms and across diﬀerent industries. Understanding the determinants of credit-spread
changes and credit-spread slope changes for ﬁrms across industries remains a topic for future
research.
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31Table I.  
Descriptive statistics of subordinated debt trade sample 
 
Panel A shows the number of trades and firms in our banking and non-banking firm samples, step-by-step, through our screening 
process. The first column records all data found in the NAIC database for 1994 through 1999. The first screen eliminates all debt 
instruments other than fixed-rate US dollar denominated debt that are non-callable, non-puttable, non-convertible, not part of an 
unit (e.g., sold with warrants) and have no sinking fund. We also exclude debt with asset-backed and credit enhancement 
features. We eliminate non-investment grade debt. We use only trade prices. Further, we eliminate all data that have inconsistent 
or suspicious issue/dates/maturity/coupon etc., or otherwise does not look reasonable. The second screen eliminates all those 
firm-quarter combinations for which we had less than 6 trades for the quarter, to ensure that we could obtain reliable estimates 
for the credit spread curve for a firm at the end of each quarter. The third and final screen removes transactions from firms for 
which firm-specific risk measures are not found in the Y-9 and call reports for banking firms and Compustat Quarterly files for 
the non-banking firms, for all the 24 quarters of our trade data, one quarter before our trade data begins, and one quarter after our 
trade data ends. 
 
Panels B and C show the frequency distribution of issues falling under different maturity, coupon and rating categories for 50 
banking firms (535 issues) and 133 non-banking firms (2335 issues) that make up our final sample of trades. 
 
PANEL A: The screening process 
Initial sample  Sample after first  
screen 
Sample after second screen  Sample after third  
screen 
 
# Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms 
Banking 




240876  3265  26608 245 16480 210  9703  133 
 
PANEL B: Banking firms: Final Sample 
 
Maturity in years 
Proportion of 
Issues 
Coupon Rate  Proportion of Issues  Examiner Rating  Proportion of Issues 
≤ 1   12%  ≤ 3%  3%  1  50% 
1 to 5   33%  3% to 6%  7%  2  45% 
5 to 10  26%  6% to 7%  45%  3  5% 
10 to 25  25%  7% to 8%  27%     
> 25   4%  > 8%  18%     
 
PANEL C: Non-Banking firms: Final Sample 
 
Maturity in years 
Proportion of 
Issues 
Coupon Rate  Proportion of Issues  Credit Rating  Proportion of Issues 
≤ 2   28%  4% to 6%  19%  AAA and AA  11% 
2 to 5  30%  6% to 7%  37%  A  31% 
5 to 10   26%  7% to 8%  25%  BBB  14% 
10 to 25   11%  8% to 10%  13%  BB and below  3% 
> 25   5%  > 10%  6%  Not Rated  41% 
    
Table II.  
The determinants of credit spread levels for banking firms  
 
The table shows the partial F statistics and the p values of the blocks of explanatory variables given everything else, when k-year 
credit spread, S
k, is regressed on the vectors of firm-specific risk characteristics, F, liquidity variables, L, and market variables, 
M, using the following regression equation:  
) (t S
k
i = + F 0 β
k
F β i(t) + L
k





across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t), where k is 3 or 7. High Rating category 
comprises banking firms with examination rating of 1, and low rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low 
categories based on total assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or 
below the sample median respectively. 
 
3 year credit spreads 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 




























































































2  0.293 0.373 0.245 0.403 0.380 0.473 0.280 0.438 0.275 0.393 0.279 
7 year credit spreads 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 




























































































2  0.244 0.363 0.192 0.512 0.288 0.642 0.181 0.475 0.215 0.328 0.233 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Table III.  
The determinants of 3-year credit spread changes for banking firms  
 
PANEL A shows the partial F statistics and p values of the blocks of explanatory variables given everything else, when changes 
in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, ∆F, liquidity 
variables, ∆L, and market variables, ∆M, using the following regression equation:  
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k






PANEL B shows the partial F statistic and p value of the block of changes in firm-specific risk variables given everything else, 
when changes in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, ∆F, 
liquidity variables, ∆L, and time effect dummy variables, T, using the following regression equation:  
 








F β i(t) + ∆L
k






across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t), where k is 3.  High Rating category 
comprises banking firms with examination rating of 1, and low rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low 
categories based on total assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or 
below the sample median respectively. 
 
PANEL A 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 




























































































2  0.476 0.432 0.525 0.475 0.471 0.641 0.393 0.538 0.435 0.517 0.418 
PANEL B 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 
















































2  0.442 0.430 0.495 0.449 0.423 0.631 0.359 0.517 0.413 0.464 0.408 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Table IV. 
 The determinants of 7-year credit spread changes for banking firms  
 
PANEL A shows the partial F statistics and p values of the blocks of explanatory variables given everything else, when changes 
in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, ∆F, liquidity 
variables, ∆L, and market variables, ∆M, using the following regression equation:  
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PANEL B shows the partial F statistic and the p value of the block of changes in firm-specific risk variables given everything 
else, when changes in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, 
∆F, liquidity variables, ∆L, and time effect dummy variables, T, using the following regression equation:  
 








F β i(t) + ∆L
k






across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t), where k is 7.  High Rating category 
comprises banking firms with examination rating of 1, and low rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low 
categories based on total assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or 
below the sample median respectively. 
 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 





























































































2  0.440 0.424 0.449 0.398 0.465 0.579 0.375 0.394 0.446 0.502 0.334 
PANEL B 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 
















































2  0.412 0.416 0.373 0.395 0.437 0.549 0.370 0.354 0.450 0.505 0.361 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.  Table V.  
Market variables that explain changes in credit spreads for banking firms 
 
The table shows the standardized beta coefficients and the t statistics of the elements of the market block of explanatory variables 
given everything else, when credit spread changes are regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, 
∆F, liquidity variables, ∆L, and market variables, ∆M, using the following regression equation:  
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across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t), where k is 3 or 7.  High Rating category 
comprises banking firms with examination rating of 1, and low rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low 
categories based on total assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or 
below the sample median respectively. 
Changes in 3 year Credit Spreads 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Market variable  All 































































































































Changes in 7 year Credit Spreads 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Market variable  All 































































































































* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Table VI. 
The determinants of credit spread slope and changes in credit spread slope for banking firms 
 
PANEL A shows the partial F statistics and the p values for all blocks of explanatory variables given everything else, when the 7 
year minus 3 year credit spread slope, SL, is regressed on the vectors of firm-specific risk characteristics, F, liquidity variables, 
L, and market variables, M, using the following regression equation:  
 
) (t SLi = +  +  F 0 β 1 β ) ( 3 t Si F β i(t) + L L β i(t) + M(t) +  (t)  M β i e
 
across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t). 
 
PANEL B shows the partial F statistic and the p value of the block of changes in firm-specific variables given everything else, 
when changes in the 7 year minus 3 year credit spread slope, ∆SL, is regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk 
characteristics, ∆F, liquidity variables, ∆L, and market variables, ∆M, using the following regression equation:    
 
∆ = +  +  ∆F ) (t SLi 0 β 1 β ) 1 ( − t SLi F β i(t) + ∆L L β i(t) +  ∆M(t)+  (t)  M β i e
 
across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t). High Rating category comprises banking 
firms with examination rating of 1, and low rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low categories based on total 
assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or below the sample median 
respectively. 
 
PANEL A: 7 year minus 3 year credit spread slope 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 






























































































2  0.187 0.085 0.151 0.417 0.055 0.458 0.108 0.297 0.128 0.215 0.079 
PANEL B: Changes in the 7 year minus 3 year credit spread slope  
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 
















































2  0.580 0.645 0.542 0.559 0.599 0.668 0.528 0.577 0.580 0.621 0.538 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Table VII. 
 The importance of changes in firm variables in explaining changes in credit spreads for banking firms: 
Lagged firm variable effects 
 
This table shows the partial F statistics and  p values of the 2 blocks of changes in firm-specific risk variables given everything 
else, when changes in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed, on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, 
∆F, liquidity variables, ∆L, and market variables, ∆M, lagged firm risk characteristics, Fi (t-1), and the interaction between         
Fi (t-1) and ∆F, using the following regression equation:     
   








FL β i(t-1) +  F
k
I β i(t-1)∆Fi(t) + ∆F
k
F β i(t) + ∆L
k






across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t), where k is 3 or 7.  High Rating category 
comprises banking firms with examination rating of 1, and low rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low 
categories based on total assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or 
below the sample median respectively. 
 
Changes in 3 year credit spreads 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 





Bank BHC High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 









































2  0.490 0.517 0.541 0.569 0.510 0.712 0.412 0.588 0.462 0.554 0.441 
Changes in 7 year credit spreads  
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 





Bank BHC High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 









































2  0.453 0.510 0.467 0.563 0.484 0.684 0.413 0.466 0.475 0.553 0.375 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Table VIII. 
 The importance of changes in firm variables, stock returns and changes in ratings in explaining changes in 
credit spreads for banking firms: The control variables effect 
 
The table shows the partial F statistics and the p values of the blocks of firm-specific risk variables, stock returns and changes in 
examiner ratings given everything else, when changes in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed on the vectors of changes in 
firm-specific risk characteristics, ∆F, liquidity variables, ∆L, market variables, ∆M, and control variables, ∆C, using the 
following regression equations, with k =3, 7.  
 








F β i(t) + ∆L
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The table also shows the results when changes in the 7 year minus 3 year credit spread slope, ∆SL, is regressed on the vectors of 
changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, ∆F, liquidity variables, ∆L, market variables, ∆M, and control variables, ∆C, using 
the following regression equation:  
   
∆ = +  +  ∆F ) (t SLi 0 β 1 β ) 1 ( − t SLi F β i(t) + ∆L L β i(t) +  ∆M(t) +  ∆C M β C β i(t) + e (t)  i
 
across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t).  The control variables comprise stock 
returns and change in examiner ratings. 
 
 
Explanatory power of the 
variable block 
given everything else 
Changes in 3 year credit 
spreads 
Changes in 7 year credit 
spreads 
Changes in the 7 year minus 3 
year credit spread slope 
 






























2  0.480 0.426 0.543 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Table IX. 
 The determinants of credit spread changes for non-banking firms 
 
The table shows the partial F statistic and the p value of each block of explanatory variables given everything else, when changes 
in the k-year credit spread, ∆S
k, are regressed on the vectors of changes in firm-specific risk characteristics, ∆F, liquidity 
variables, ∆L, and market variables, ∆M, using the following regression equation:  
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across all firms (each firm denoted by i) and all quarters (each quarter denoted by t), where k is 3 or 7.  High Rating category 
comprises firms that have ‘A’ rating or above, and low rating category the remaining firms. High and low categories based on 
total assets, leverage and Return on Assets (ROA) are defined in terms of being above the sample median or below the sample 
median respectively. 
 
3 year credit spread changes 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 





























































































2  0.166 0.108 0.214 0.101 0.284 0.241 0.073 0.253 0.095 0.091 0.241 
7 year credit spread changes 
Type of firm  Rating  Size: Total Assets Leverage Profitability:  ROA 
Explanatory 





























































































2  0.219 0.119 0.283 0.104 0.415 0.293 0.087 0.304 0.124 0.047 0.450 
* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.  Table X.  
Preventative influence of subordinated debt for Banking Firms 
 
Panels A and B respectively show the average change in the raw and the matched-adjusted firm-specific risk characteristics from 
before it first issued any subordinated debt to after it did, and the corresponding t statistics. For this exercise we are limited to 14 
banks and 14 BHCs that first issued SND in or after 1988 because all data from the Y-9 and call reports are available only after 
1988. For each bank (BHC) that issues subordinated debt for the first time, a matched portfolio of 10 non-issuing banks (BHCs) 
is constructed as follows. For each bank (BHC), we find the closest 250 non-issuing banks (BHCs) based on Total Assets (size). 
From out of these 250 banks (BHCs), we find the closest 50 firms based on leverage. At this stage, we have a set of 50 non-
issuing banks or BHCs for each issuing bank or BHC that are matched to the issuer in terms of Total Assets and leverage. Next, 
from out of these 50 banks (BHCs), we find the closest 10 firms based on ROA. This set of 10 non-issuers (that are closest to the 
issuer in terms of Total Assets, Leverage, and ROA in addition to being the same type of firm (bank or BHC) and having the 
same examiner rating in the issuing quarter) form our matched portfolio for that issuer. We find such a set of matched non-
issuing firms for each issuer in our sample. 
 
PANEL A: Raw changes 
  Average change from the 
quarter before the first issue 
of SND to the quarter after 
the first issue of SND 
(t statistic: H0 =0) 
Average change from the half 
year before the first issue of SND 
to the half year after the first 
issue of SND 
           (t statistic: H0 =0) 
Average change from the year 
before the first issue of SND to 
the year after the first issue of 
SND 












































PANEL B: Matched-Adjusted changes 
  Average change from the 
quarter before the first issue 
of SND to the quarter after 
the first issue of SND 
(t statistic: H0 =0) 
Average change from the half 
year before the first issue of SND 
to the half year after the first 
issue of SND 
           (t statistic: H0 =0) 
Average change from the year 
before the first issue of SND to 
the year after the first issue of 
SND 












































* denotes significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Figure 1.   
Riskless Interest rates: Pricing Errors 
 
This figure shows the one-week ahead prediction errors (in basis points) for several maturities when our model is 
used to estimate riskless yields, using the Kalman-Filter procedure. The errors are presented in the form of box-and-
whiskers plots. The darkened box covers the 25
th to 75
th percentiles, and the whiskers the reminder. The weekly data 
used in the analysis covers the period from January 1993 through December 2000, and comprises Constant Maturity 
Treasury rates of different maturities downloaded from the web site of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.   
 
Errors in Riskless Interest Rates


























-60Figure 2.   
Pricing Errors of Risky Debt 
 
This Figure shows the percentage errors when our model is used to price subordinated debt issued by banking and 
non-banking firms across different maturity buckets: defined as 0-2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years and > 
20 years. 
 
Pricing Errors for Banks
Maturity Bucket


















































Pricing Errors for Non Banks
Maturity Bucket




































 Figure 3. 
Pricing errors across Banking Firms 
 
This figure shows the histogram of average percentage errors in bond prices by bank across all banking firms when 
our model is used to price subordinated debt. The average error is close to zero, and the figure reveals no significant 
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 Figure 4. 
Time Series fluctuations of Credit Spreads for Banking Firms and Non-Banking Firms 
 
The Figure shows the time series of quarterly 3-year credit spreads for a random sample of banks and non-banks. 
Not all the time series are complete for all 24 quarters. The credit spreads are reported in basis points. The right 
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